When a court binds, this application of precedent is sometimes called a horizontal decile gaze. New York State has a similar appeal structure in that it is divided into four appeals divisions overseen by the last New York Court of Appeals. The decisions of one Appeal Division are not binding on another and, in some cases, the divisions differ considerably in the interpretation of the law. The case law differs from the pure precedent of the common law in this sense, which is typical of the Franco-Roman legal order, in that the case law derives first of all from the interpretation of written or known norms, laws and regulations, contrario sensu of the common law, since the whole law derives from the hypothesis of similar solutions proposed in other cases by other courts of appeal. 4.8 The Court considers that the section on probable doctrine in Article 24 of Law 1340 of 2009 provides for the possibility of creating a probable doctrine at the administrative headquarters if the powers of supervision, supervision and control are exercised in the investigations and decisions of the SIC concerning the protection of free competition and the administrative supervision of unfair competition. In this case, a more formal link with the administrative precedent developed in accordance with the constitutional principles of equality, legal certainty, good faith and the protection of legitimate expectations is presented. In this case, it is appropriate to apply the line of case-law according to which the decision to accept the probable doctrine must be justified, in particular that the link with it must not constitute an obstacle for the administrative unit to be able to depart from that doctrine, having regard to the present case, by justifying the action by sufficient reasons to avoid premature and decontextualised changes[16]. 3.1. The Council of State, faced with its own precedent The Supreme Court of Ordinary Law has invoked the interpretation of the Constitutional Court on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, in particular the probable doctrine of the legal regulation of the nineteenth century. In this way, he has stated that his sentences are mandatory for judges of lower hierarchy. The precedent or the previous law is a formal source of the creation of the law, consists in the fact that it is not derived from the law approved by the legislative bodies, but from the solutions that they adopt before certain cases, especially the courts, so that they represent a kind of doctrine, a paradigm of solution, exactly a precedent. that now all or some other dishes must join.
1.1. Ignorance of precedent as a particular reason for the adequacy of protection against judicial judgments In a recent judgment, the last group of ordinary jurisdiction repeated the above postulates in order to reaffirm the imperative nature of its precedents with regard to higher courts and lower-ranking judges, without understanding that they automatically or mechanically comply with the requirements of ordinary case-law. [34]. This determines a certain freedom of common law judges, who are in fact relatively free to distance themselves or deviate from the doctrine established by precedents and to provide for a new rule by making a decision that is partially different from the previous one or completely different from the previous one, thus creating a new precedent, only if this solution is accepted and applied by other judges. In this way, the common law maintains an ongoing dynamic of change. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in his book The Common Law (1881), «The life of the common law was not logical, but experimental.» This text attempts to reconstruct the concept of precedent in the light of recent legislation and case law on the subject. To this end, the general justification for precedent in the Colombian legal system, prepared at an early stage by the Constitutional Court, was examined and the binding force of the jurisprudence of other high courts was examined. The working hypothesis is that any decision of one of the Supreme Courts sets precedents and creates a heavier argumentative burden for judicial and administrative officials who choose to deviate from it. However, it should be clarified that the criteria relating to the value and scope of the precedent apply to both constitutionality decisions and guardianship judgments rendered at the time of review. 4.6 In the present case, it is not true, as the applicants claim, that the link with the probable doctrine can only be established by a constitutional provision.
Article 4 of Law 169 of 1896, which binds the probable doctrine of the Supreme Court, has a legal and unconstitutional hierarchy and refers to constitutional principles such as the right to equality (art. 13), the protection of legitimate expectations, good faith (art. 83) and legal certainty. For this reason, the Court considers that the applicants` interpretation that Judgment C-836 of 2001 held that this doctrine can be established only by the Constitution is erroneous. On many issues, reasonable people may disagree. If two of these people are judges, the tension between two lines of precedent can be resolved as follows. For the Council of State, precedents exert an attraction within its own jurisdiction and theoretically recognize the relative prevalence of constitutional jurisprudence. In the federal legal systems of several common law countries, and particularly in the United States, it is relatively common for different lower-level justice systems (e.g., state courts in the United States and Australia, provincial courts in Canada) to view decisions of other jurisdictions in the same country as a compelling precedent.
Especially in the United States, the adoption of a legal doctrine by many other branches of state justice is seen as very convincing evidence that such a doctrine is preferred. A good example is Tennessee`s introduction of comparative negligence (which replaces contributory negligence as a complete barrier to recovery) through McIntyre v. Balentine (at the time, all U.S. jurisdictions except Tennessee, five other states, and the District of Columbia had implemented systems of comparative negligence). In addition, the Erie Doctrine in U.S. law requires that federal courts involved in diversity lawsuits apply the substantive law of the state, but in accordance with how the court believes that the state`s highest court would rule in this case. Because these decisions are not binding on state courts, but are often very well reasoned and useful, state courts often cite federal interpretations of state law as a persuasive precedent, although it is also common for a state supreme court to refuse to interpret its jurisprudence by a federal court.